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Abstract This paper addresses the issue of the multiplicity of various grades of
discernibility that can be defined in model theory. Building upon earlier works on the
subject, I first expand the known logical categorizations of discernibility by intro-
ducing several symmetry-based concepts of discernibility, including one I call
‘‘witness symmetry-discernibility’’. Then I argue that only grades of discernibility
stronger than this one possess certain intuitive features necessary to individuate
objects. Further downsizing of the set of non-equivalent grades of discernibility can
be achieved by stipulating that any relation of discernibility should be applied only to
those pairs of objects which have been previously distinguished (in a suitable sense)
from the rest of the universe. Restricting discernibility to pairs of objects satisfying
this condition gives an additional bonus in the form of restoring the transitivity of
some types of indiscernibility which have been known to be non-transitive.
1 Introduction
The notion of qualitative discernibility is extensively used in modern
metaphysical discussions on the topic of identity and individuality. Recent
foundational work has revealed that the concept of discernibility admits a whole
spectrum of possible formal interpretations.1 There are several known general
types, or grades, of discernibility, and they in turn split into further subcategories
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1 The most comprehensive analyses of the logic of discernibility to date include (Ketland 2011; Caulton




depending on the expressive power of the language in which the discerning is
done. The abundance of various interpretations of discernibility is troubling,
since it seriously hampers any constructive debate involving this notion, the
reason being that for each argument using one interpretation of discernibility an
equally compelling counterargument employing an alternative interpretation is
likely to be found. In particular, questions such as ‘‘Are elementary particles (or
spacetime points) discernible?’’ do not admit definite answers, since it is
necessary to specify further what sense of discernibility the inquirer has in
mind.2 While in philosophy it is not uncommon to give only qualified and
conditional answers to many important questions, some measures might be
considered to reduce the plethora of logical concepts brought together under the
umbrella of discernibility.
I believe that this goal can be achieved by reconsidering what work the concept
of discernibility is supposed to do for us. When we talk about discerning two
objects, we usually have one of the following two separate things in mind. One
sense of discerning involves recognizing some qualitative differences (whether in
the form of different properties or different relations) between the objects
considered. When we discern objects in this sense, we should (at least in principle)
be able to pick out one of them but not the other. Being able to discern objects in
that way seems to be a prerequisite for making successful reference, or giving a
unique name, to each individual object. But by discerning we can also mean
recognizing objects as numerically distinct. In this sense of the word, discernment is
a process by which, using some qualitative features of the objects, we make sure that
there are indeed two entities and not one.
The latter of the above-mentioned intuitions associated with discernibility is
related to the much-discussed metaphysical goal of ‘‘grounding’’ numerical
distinctness in qualitative facts. The rough idea behind this goal is that the fact
that object a is numerically distinct from object b cannot be ‘‘bare’’, or further
unanalyzable. There must be some qualitative facts about a and b which ‘‘make’’
them two objects rather than one. Thus, two objects are discerned in the considered
sense if there is some fact involving their qualitative properties and relations which
logically entails that they are numerically distinct. But numerical diversity does not
necessarily guarantee that the objects in question will achieve the metaphysical
status of individuals. Individuation involves things such as the possibility of
2 The impact of the existence of multiple interpretations of discernibility on some debates in modern
metaphysics of science can be best illustrated using the problem of the identity and individuality of
particles in quantum mechanics as an example. The symmetrization postulate, which is an important part
of the formalism of the quantum theory of many particles, is taken to imply that particles of the same type
are not discernible by properties and relations, and thus violate the Leibnizian Principle of the Identity of
Indiscernibles (French and Redhead 1988, Butterfield 1993). However, some authors argue that there is a
sense of discernibility (known as weak discernibility) which allows a variant of the PII to retain its
validity for identical fermions and even bosons (Saunders 2003, 2006; Muller and Saunders 2008; Muller




reference, or labelling, and therefore is closely associated with the first of the above
senses of discernibility.3
Throughout this paper I will limit myself solely to the first reading of the notion of
discernibility. I believe that the recent discussions on the discernibility of objects
postulated in contemporary physical theories are mainly motivated by the need to
ensure that these objects are indeed individuals, and not by the desire to ground their
numerical diversity in qualitative facts. I will argue that only a small subset of all the
available grades of discernibility can actually accomplish the former task, and this
observation can lead to a significant reduction of their number, as will be shown in
Sects. 3 and 5. Moreover, this number can be further scaled down by introducing a new
restriction on the pairs of objects that are supposed to be discerned. This issue will be
discussed in Sects. 6 and 7 of this paper. Sections 2 and 4 will mostly contain
summaries of known facts regarding extant grades of discernibility and their
connections with the presence of symmetries.
2 Grades of Discernibility
We will start our investigations by giving a brief overview of the known grades of
discernibility and their logical relations (in this exposition I will closely follow
Ladyman et al. 2012). Let LA be a first-order language without the identity symbol
and without constants, which describes a particular relational structure A. The
following standard types of discernibility (originally due to Quine 1976) are defined
as follows:
(1) Absolute discernibility: AbsA(a, b) iff there is a formula u(x) in LA such that
Au að Þ and A2u bð Þ.
(2) Relative discernibility: RelA(a, b) iff there is a formula u(x, y) in LA such that
Au a; bð Þ and A2u b; að Þ.
(3) Weak discernibility: WeakA(a, b) iff there is a formula u(x, y) in LA such that
Au a; bð Þ and A2u a; að Þ.
It is sometimes useful to distinguish as a separate category intrinsic discernibility
IntA(a, b), which is just absolute discernibility restricted to formulas that do not
contain any quantifiers. Two more languages can be considered besides LA: one is
the language L¼A containing identity, and the other is the language LA which is
assumed to contain an individual constant for each element in the domain of model
A (technically this means that LA describes not structure A but its extension A in
which all elements of the domain are distinguished). Definitions 1–3 can now be




=(a, b), AbsA*(a, b), RelA*(a, b),
3 Muller and Saunders (2008), as well as Caulton and Butterfield (2012), use the term ‘‘individual’’ as
referring to objects that are absolutely discernible. While absolute discernibility guarantees the possibility
of individuation in the above sense, later I will argue that there may be other types of discernibility that
achieve the same objective. Throughout the paper I will use the term ‘‘individual’’ in a sense broader than
the one used by the above-mentioned authors. I urge the reader to keep this in mind, to avoid possible
confusion.
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WeakA*(a, b). The logical relations between the introduced variants of discernibility
are depicted in Fig. 1 below (cf. Ladyman et al. 2012, p. 177).4
From the diagram we can immediately notice that there are actually 7
extensionally distinct grades of discernibility (or 5 if we ignore intrinsic variants
of absolute discernibility), which is a rather large number. It is easy to observe that
each variant of discernibility can play the role of a qualitative ‘‘grounding’’ of the
relation of numerical distinctness, since all of them logically imply that a = b.5
However, it is not at all clear whether all notions of discernibility, when applied to
objects a and b, can be assumed to ensure that a is qualitatively different from b in
the sense specified above. We will now move on to discuss this issue in more detail.
3 Witness-Discernibility
How can we single out one specific object out of a pair of entities using their purely
qualitative characteristics? One sure method to do that is to appeal to a difference in
properties. If a possesses a property P which b lacks, this can give us a simple
method of separating them as individual entities. In such a case we can always refer
to a and not to b with the help of the description ‘‘The object that possesses P’’.
Thus, absolute discernibility (whether intrinsic or extrinsic) clearly achieves the
required objective.
4 It is also possible to consider the language L¼A containing both the identity symbol and constants for all
elements of the domain. However, it is easy to observe that all grades of discernibility in L¼A collapse into
numerical distinctness, therefore I will ignore this possibility. The issue of which of the three languages
LA, L¼A , and LA should be preferred in discussions on the concept of discernibility is a delicate one, and I
do not wish to make any definite assertion here, noting only some typical arguments and
counterarguments that may be used in the debate. First, it may be pointed out that the practice of
using the identity symbol is so widespread in any scientific language that the language LA seems to be
unrealistically impoverished. Nonetheless, in the context of discernibility there may be good reasons for
holding on to such an artificially restricted language. As is well known, in language with identity all
numerically distinct objects are weakly discernible by the formula x = y. Hence those who believe that
the weak discernibility of elementary particles or spatiotemporal points restores their metaphysical status
of individuals (or at least that of relationals, if we adhere to Muller and Saunders’s terminology) had
better not use the language with identity on pain of trivializing their claim. Second, there are good reasons
to remain skeptical regarding the utility of the language LA, which contains names for each individual in
the domain. But there are two interesting logical facts about discernibility in LA which are worth
mentioning here. One is that, contrary to popular belief, distinct objects are not absolutely discernible in
LA by virtue of possessing their unique names (we need identity to construct absolutely discerning
formulas in LA). The other is that absolute, relative and weak discernibilities become extensionally
equivalent in LA. However, given the limited applicability of LA in reconstructing scientific theories, I
will mostly ignore it in further considerations.
5 On the other hand, it should be stressed that the implications in the opposite direction (i.e. from the
numerical distinctness of objects to their discernibility of appropriate kinds) are not guaranteed by logic
alone. In order to close the logical gap between discernibility and numerical distinctness we need a
metaphysical assumption in the form of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII). As I already
noted in footnote 2, the recent interest in developing new grades of discernibility weaker than absolute
discernibility has been spurred by the apparent violation of the absolute form of PII in the case of
quantum particles of the same type and the case of space–time points (see also my closing remarks at the
end of Sect. 8).
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However, this is not the only method of differentiating between objects. Even if
a and b are not discernible by their properties, still it may be possible to tell them
apart using other objects as reference points. It may happen, for instance, that there
is yet another object c in the domain for which it is true that c stands in a certain
relation R to a but not to b. Such an object can be called a witness, and the existence
of a witness (henceforth referred to as witness-discernibility) seems to secure the
possibility of an effective separation of a and b.
Using the generic concept of witness-discernibility, it may now be argued that
even merely weakly discernible objects can be effectively differentiated by a
witness. For if u(x, y) is a formula which weakly discerns a and b, then it is true that
there is an object c such that Au c; bð Þ and yet A2u c; að Þ—it is namely a itself.
However, we can immediately notice that something is not right here. How can an
object which has not yet been differentiated from the other one play the role of a
witness to do the differentiation? Clearly, some further restrictions have to be placed
on the notion of a witness. One obvious candidate for such a requirement seems to
be that a witness should not be identical with any of the two objects to be discerned
by it. But this restriction is too weak, as the following graph shows (Fig. 2).6
Here c apparently assumes the role of a witness for a and b, since it stands in
some relation R (represented by an arrow) to a and not to b. But an effective
identification of a by c is thwarted by the existence of yet another object d which
stands in the same relation to b and not to a. Since c and d do not bear any labels that
may differentiate them, it is impossible to say which of them is supposed to be our
selected witness. This idea was picked up by Ladyman and Bigaj (2010) in their
proposal of how to define a satisfactory concept of witness-discernibility (which
they call ‘‘relational physical discernibility’’). They insist that for an object to be a
witness it has to be the case that all objects not absolutely discernible from it should
remain in the same relation R to a and not to b. Thanks to this additional
requirement it doesn’t actually matter which object in a given absolute-
indiscernibility class we will select to serve as a witness—all of them will
uniformly point to a and not to b. Ladyman and Bigaj’s concept of witness
discernibility can be spelled out as follows:
Fig. 1 Logical relations between grades of discernibility
6 Actually, this restriction is also too strong. In some cases it is legitimate to use one of the differentiated
objects as a witness. This is the case when objects a and b are absolutely discernible. In that case object
a can be considered a witness discerning a from b.
On Discernibility and Symmetries 121
123
(4) Witness discernibility: WitA(a, b) iff there is an object c 2 domðAÞ) and a
formula u(x, y) in LA such that for all d 2 domðAÞ, if :AbsA(c, d), then
Au d; að Þ and A2u d; bð Þ.7
As was the case with the other grades of discernibility, witness discernibility can
be alternatively defined relative to a language with identity (L¼A ) or a language
equipped with constants for each object (LA). The issue of the logical relations
between witness-discernibility and the remaining grades of discernibility has been
recently scrutinized by Linnebo and Muller (2013). They have proven that witness-
discernibility actually comes very close to absolute discernibility. More specifically,
witness-discernibility is equivalent to absolute discernibility in models with finite
domains, as well as in languages that admit infinite formulas. The equivalence also
holds relative to languages in which all elements of the domain (whether finite or
infinite) have unique names. The only case in which two objects can be witness-
discerned but not absolutely discerned is when the model contains an infinite
number of elements and the language neither allows for infinite conjunctions nor
contains names for each individual object.
The effective collapse of witness-discernibility into absolute discernibility is not
necessarily bad news for those who are troubled by the excessive number of
available interpretations of what it means to discern two objects. For it suggests that
our intuitive reading of discernibility as a way to tell two objects apart is best
expressed in the good old notion of absolute discernibility by properties (intrinsic or
extrinsic). In particular, Ladyman and Bigaj employed their concept of witness-
discernibility to argue against the use of weak discernibility as a means to
rehabilitate the principle of the identity of indiscernibles in the context of quantum
mechanics.8 But it turns out that the general idea of introducing witnesses to discern
Fig. 2 A scenario in which objects are not discerned by a witness
7 This definition of witness-discernibility is a simplified but equivalent version of Definition 5 given in
(Ladyman and Bigaj 2010, p. 128), following the suggestion made in (Linnebo and Muller 2013, p. 1136).
8 Ladyman and Bigaj thereby join a long list of critics of weak discernibility which includes, among
others, Hawley (2006, 2009), French and Krause (2006), van Fraassen and Peschard (2008) and Dieks and
Versteegh (2008). Of course the list of supporters of weak discernibility is equally impressive. Besides
Saunders, Muller and Seevinck, who were already mentioned in footnote 2, it contains Caulton and
Butterfield (2012), Dorato and Morganti (2013), Huggett and Norton (2013).
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objects can find an alternative formalization which is not tied to absolute
discernibility. In order to explain this issue in detail, we will have to introduce
the important concept of symmetry.
4 Symmetries
It is commonly acknowledged that the existence of symmetries is related to the
problem of discernibility, although opinions vary as to how close this relation is.9
An important difference between discernibility and symmetries is that the former
always involves a language, whereas symmetries characterize structures directly
without any linguistic mediation. However, we should not forget that there is a close
correspondence (even though not one–one) between a structure and a language it is
described in. By changing the language in which we wish to discern objects we
usually select a different corresponding structure (for instance, adding the identity
symbol ‘‘=’’ to our language we have to expand the considered structure to include
the relation of identity).
A symmetry of a relational structure A (also referred to as an automorphism of
A) is characterized informally as a bijective mapping of its domain domðAÞ which
preserves all its relations. A formal definition is as follows:
(5) A bijection p : domðAÞ ! domðAÞ is a symmetry of A iff for every relation
R in A and all objects a1; . . .; an 2 domðAÞ; Ra1. . .an iff Rp a1ð Þ. . .p anð Þ.
Let us define a binary relation SymA on the domain of A:
(6) SymA(a, b) iff there is a symmetry p of A such that p(a) = b.
It is easy to observe that SymA is an equivalence relation (it is reflexive, symmetric and
transitive). Thus, the entire domain can be partitioned into equivalence classes with
respect to SymA. We will call them ‘‘classes of symmetry-indiscernibility’’. Note also
that adding the relation of identity to structure A does not change its symmetries, i.e.
SymA(a, b) iff SymA
=(a, b). On the other hand, adding constants for each object in the
domain has the effect of reducing all symmetries of relational structureA to the trivial
one: SymA*(a, b) iff a = b. For that reason we will only consider one relation of
symmetry-indiscernibility SymA(a, b) in subsequent discussions.
Now I will report some well-known model-theoretic facts which concern the
logical relations between symmetries and other grades of discernibility.10
9 Ladyman et al. (2012, p. 181) express the opinion that the connection between symmetries and
discernibility is not as close as one might expect. But their main argument is that the non-existence of
certain symmetries is not equivalent to any previously introduced grades of discernibility. However, it
may still be maintained that the lack of certain symmetries defines new grades of discernibility which are
logically related to the other grades.
10 As Ladyman et al. (2012) point out, Theorem 1 follows directly from the fact that symmetries preserve
satisfaction of all complex formulae, i.e. if a formula is satisfied by an n-tuple of objects, it will be
satisfied by the images of these objects under any symmetry.
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Theorem 1
(a) If AbsA(a, b), then :SymA(a, b),
(b) If AbsA
=(a, b), then :SymA(a, b).
Theorem 1 states that if there is a formula satisfied by one object but not the other
(whether the formula contains identity or not), these two objects cannot be
connected by a symmetry. However, the question of implication in the opposite
direction is more complicated, as the following theorems show.
Theorem 211
(a) If A is finite, then AbsA=(a, b) iff :SymA(a, b),
(b) There are infinite structures such that for some a; b 2 domðAÞ, :SymA(a, b)
and :AbsA=(a, b).
Theorem 3 There are finite structures such that for some a; b 2 domðAÞ,
:SymA(a, b) and :AbsA(a, b).
Theorem 2(a) states that in finite models the non-existence of a symmetry
connecting two objects a and b is equivalent to absolute discernibility by formulas
containing identity. However, according to Theorem 3 even in finite cases it is
possible to find objects a and b that are not symmetry-related, and yet no formula
without identity can discern them. The following example illustrates such a
situation. In this graph there is no symmetry mapping a into b, and yet there is no
formula without identity which is true of a and false of b, since there is no way to
express in LA the fact that a is related to two objects rather than one (Fig. 3).
I do not wish to take a stand on the issue of the admissibility of the identity symbol in
discerning formulas. The conventional wisdom is that the use of identity in that context
should be avoided on pain of circularity. However, it may be observed that if
discernibility is taken as a means to tell two objects apart rather than as a concept
grounding numerical distinctness, there seems to be nothing wrong in using identity in
discerning formulas. On the other hand, combining identity with constants can have a
detrimental effect on the task of discerning objects, since in that case every two objects
are trivially discernible by their respective ‘‘haecceities’’ expressed in formulas x = c.
The logical relation between symmetry and relative discernibility is given in the
following theorem. Theorem 4(a) follows immediately from Theorem 2(a) and the
fact that AbsA
= implies RelA
=. An example illustrating point (b) is given in (Ladyman
et al. 2012, p. 182).
Theorem 4
(a) If A is finite, then :SymA(a, b) implies RelA=(a, b)
(b) There are infinite structures such that for some a, b [ dom(A), :Sym(a, b)
and :RelA=(a, b).
The equivalence classes of symmetry-indiscernibility induced by the set of all
automorphisms of a given structure A can contain varying numbers of elements. If a
11 Theorem 2 is proven e.g. in (Caulton and Butterfield 2012, section 4.3).
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given equivalence class contains only two elements, this implies that there is a
symmetry which exchanges these elements: p(a) = b and p(b) = a. However, there
is no implication in the opposite direction. From the fact that there is a symmetry
which transposes a and b it does not follow that a and b form their own equivalence
class. The diagram below illustrates such a situation. Even though the transposition
pab (the mapping exchanging a with b and leaving everything else intact) is a
symmetry, there is yet another symmetry which exchanges a with c and
simultaneously b with d. It is easy to observe that in this case all four elements
form one class of symmetry-indiscernibility (Fig. 4).
It may be instructive to observe that the relation SymA is not the only relation of
indiscernibility that may be defined purely in terms of symmetry mappings. Two
more variants of symmetry-based indiscernibility, which turn out not to be
extensionally equivalent to SymA, can easily be introduced.
12 A stronger sense of
symmetry-based indiscernibility is obtained by requiring that there be a symmetry
which transposes elements a and b. Let us write that (the prefix S stands for
‘‘strong’’):
(7) S-SymA(a, b) iff there is a symmetry mapping p of A such that p(a) = b and
p(b) = a.
Yet another, even stronger type of symmetry-indiscernibility can be defined as
follows (SS stands for ‘‘super-strong’’):
(8) SS-SymA(a, b) iff pab is a symmetry of A.
There are obvious logical relations between the three types of symmetry-
indiscernibility which can be presented in the form of the following implications:
SS-SymA(a, b) ) S-SymA(a, b) ) SymA(a, b). The reverse implications do not
hold, as there are clearly structures in which a symmetry sends a into b and yet there
is no symmetry that swaps a with b, and structures in which a symmetry swaps
a with b but the transposition pab is not a symmetry.
Fig. 3 An example proving Theorem 3
12 I don’t discuss the intuitive meaning and appropriateness of any of these notions, as for the time being
I am only exploring the space of logical possibilities. Distinguishing analogous concepts of symmetry-
indiscernibility is common in the literature (see Ladyman et al. 2012, p. 181).
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The negations of the three types of symmetry-based indiscernibility produce
three grades of discernibility in the following order of logical strength: :SymA(a,
b) ) :S-SymA(a, b) ) :SS-SymA(a, b). We have already discussed the relations
between :SymA(a, b) and absolute indiscernibility in languages LA and L¼A . It
remains now to place the other two symmetry-based grades of discernibility in the
web of mutual logical relations with the extant grades. This can be done using the
following theorems, adopted from (Ladyman et al. 2012):
Theorem 5 If RelA
=(a, b), then :S-SymA(a, b).
Theorem 6 If :SS-SymA(a, b), then WeakA(a, b).
Theorem 5 follows from Ladyman, Linnebo and Pettigrew’s Theorem 9.6 (2) (p. 182)
by contraposition. Theorem 6 is a simple consequence of Corollary 9.4 (p. 181).
Theorem 5 can be strengthened to the form of an equivalence in finite domains, but the
converse of the implication in Theorem 5 has an infinite counterexample. On the other
hand, a dumbbell graph is a finite counterexample to the converse of Theorem 6.
To sum up, the diagram presenting the logical relations between various possible
grades of discernibility, old and new, is given below on Fig. 5 (dashed arrows
indicate implications that hold in finite domains only). Now we will have to take
steps to reduce its size. Slightly perversely, we will start this task by introducing yet
another grade of discernibility.
5 Witness Symmetry-Discernibility
The notion of witness-discernibility introduced earlier is based on the assumption that a
witness discerning objects a and b should not have a twin which would have its relations
to a and b reversed but otherwise would be qualitatively indistinguishable from the
original witness. This intuition can be spelled out in the following definition of yet another
grade of discernibility, which I will call witness symmetry-discernibility (Wit-SymA):
(9) Witness symmetry-discernibility. Wit-SymA(a, b) iff there is an object c 2
domðAÞ and a dyadic formula u in LA, such that.
(i) Au a; cð Þ and A2u b; cð Þ, and.
(ii) there is no object d and a symmetry mapping p such that p(a) = b,
p(b) = a, p(c) = d, and p(d) = c.13
Fig. 4 A four-element class of symmetry-indiscernibility
13 It may be asked here why I didn’t propose a simpler definition of symmetry-based witness
discernibility in which clause (ii) would be replaced with the following condition: (iii) there is no object
d and symmetry p such that p(a) = b and p(c) = d. The answer is that, as can be quickly verified, such a
notion of witness-discernibility is extensionally equivalent to :SymA in finite domains.
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It turns out that Wit-SymA(a, b) is an entirely new grade of discernibility, not
equivalent to any of the previously introduced ones, as seen in the following theorems.
Theorem 7 If :S-SymA(a, b), then Wit-SymA(a, b).
Theorem 8 If Wit-SymA(a, b), then :SS-SymA(a, b).
Theorem 9 The converses of Theorems 6 and 7 do not hold (not even when
restricted to finite domains).
Proof of Theorem 7 We will proceed by assuming the negation of the consequent,
i.e. assuming that a and b are not witness symmetry-discernible. Let us first consider
the case in which there is no formula u and no element c such that Au a; cð Þ and
A2u b; cð Þ. This is obviously equivalent to saying that a and b are not even weakly
discernible (they are utterly indiscernible). But utter indiscernibility implies any
other grade of indiscernibility, therefore S-SymA(a, b) by Theorem 6 and the fact
that SS-SymA ) S-SymA. The second case is when there is a formula u and an
element c such that Au a; cð Þ and A2u b; cð Þ. In that case there must be an
element d and a symmetry that swaps c with d and a with b, hence S-SymA(a, b). h
Proof of Theorem 8 Let us suppose that a and b are witness symmetry-discernible.
This means that there is an object c and a formula u such that Au a; cð Þ and
A2u b; cð Þ, and such that the clause (ii) in Def. 9 holds true as well. Now we will
consider two exhaustive cases: (a) a = c and b = c, (b) a = c or b = c. The
assumption (a) of course implies that pab is not a symmetry, given that c stands in a
particular relation to a but not to b. (b) Suppose that c = a (the case in which c = b
is perfectly analogous).We have Au a; að Þ and A2u b; að Þ. Let us assume that the
transposition pab is a symmetry. In that case b satisfies the condition expressed
in (ii) and Definition 9 is violated. Thus, pab can’t be a symmetry, and
:SS-SymA(a, b). h
Proof of Theorem 9 A counterexample to the converse of Theorem 8 is given in
Fig. 2. Objects a and b are not witness symmetry-discernible, as there is a symmetry
which swaps a with b and c with d, but pab is not a symmetry, so :SS-SymA(a, b)
holds. A counterexample to the converse of Theorem 7 is presented below (Fig. 6).
The following permutation is clearly a symmetry: p(c1) = c2, p(c2) = c3,
p(c3) = c4, p(c4) = c1, p(a) = b, p(b) = a. Thus, S-SymA(a, b). But a and b are
witness symmetry-discernible. For instance c1 is a witness to a and b, and because
there is no symmetry which would swap c1 with any other vertex while
simultaneously swapping a and b, clause (ii) is satisfied. h
Fig. 5 Logical relations between grades of discernibility including symmetry-based ones
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It seems evident that the relation Wit-SymA represents a bona fide concept of
witness-based discernibility, and thus discerning objects with the help of this relation
should enable us to tell these objects apart (equivalently, make reference to one and
not the other) by means of selecting a witness. On the other hand, the grade of
discernibility directly following Wit-SymA in the hierarchy of concepts of decreasing
logical strength, i.e. :SS-SymA, clearly does not ensure the possibility of separating
discerned objects with the help of a witness. This may be confirmed by taking a quick
glance at Fig. 2. Objects a and b are discerned by the relation :SS-SymA, as the
transposition pab is not a symmetry, and yet there is no witness in the proper sense
which could differentiate a from b (c and d are excluded, since they themselves are
not discerned from each other in the proper sense). Hence, it may be hypothesized that
Wit-SymA is the weakest possible notion of discernibility satisfying the requirement
of ensuring the possibility of a separation of objects. Those who find this requirement
compelling may now insist that no grade of discernibility weaker than Wit-SymA
should be admitted as a legitimate way of discerning two objects.
But we are not done yet with the task of pruning the excess of available grades of
discernibility. In the next section I will identify and critically examine a hidden premise
of all discussions on discernibility which has managed to escape attention of the authors
writing on this topic. Formulating this premise explicitly as a separate assumption will
lead to a further reduction of the multiplicity of the remaining grades of discernibility.
6 A Prerequisite for Discerning Two Objects
Let us focus our attention on the well-known case of a three-element circular graph
(Fig. 7). The objects in the graph are pairwise relatively discernible, as they are
connected by directional arrows. Thus, they must also be categorized as witness
symmetry-discernible, since this grade of discernibility is weaker than relative
discernibility. But one can have legitimate doubts regarding the intuitive correctness
of this assessment. To an unbiased eye the case looks like a perfect example of
Fig. 6 A counterexample to the converse of Theorem 7
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indiscernibility, if there is any. Each vertex in the triangle appears to be a perfect copy
of any other vertex with respect to the place it occupies in the structure. How could
there be a procedure which would single out one vertex from the entire structure?
Remaining for a while on the level of informal intuitions, we can anticipate the
following reply to this challenge. It may be argued that indeed such a procedure
does exist, thanks to the notion of a witness. If we consider any two out of three
vertices on the diagram, it can be easily observed that one vertex from the selected
pair can be discerned from the other one by the fact that there is a witness (the third
vertex) which stands in different relations to both. I do not contest this intuitive
assessment, but I would like to point out that the successful execution of this
procedure is contingent upon an earlier separation of the entire structure into the
pair of objects to be further discerned and the remaining witness. And here lies the
rub: we have no reason whatsoever to believe that such a separation could be
achieved on the basis of the available qualitative description of the entire relational
structure. Indeed, such a separation seems to be outright impossible, since it would
already achieve the goal we are pursuing, namely an effective identification of one
object (i.e. the witness) against the background of the remaining elements.
We have thus managed to uncover the following implicit presupposition of all the
logical reconstructions of the concept of qualitative discernibility. As the relation of
discernibility is defined as a two-place relation between objects in a given structure,
the assumption is that we already know which two objects we are talking about when
we want to discern between them. Sometimes this assumption is indeed satisfied, but
sometimes it is not, as the three-vertex case clearly shows. Thus, I propose to restrict
the applicability of the notion of witness symmetry-discernibility (and any other grade
of discernibility for that matter) to cases where the two objects in question are already
singled out in an appropriate sense from the rest of the universe. Of course, in order to
avoid the charge of question-begging, we can’t use for that purpose the very notion of
discernibility that we are trying to apply to discern the objects themselves. One
possible solution is to resort to the more universal concept of classes of symmetry-
indiscernibility. The suggestion is that in order to test any relation of discernibility on a
pair of objects (which, potentially, can turn out to be one and the same object), we
should make sure that this pair does not belong to a symmetry-indiscernibility class
containing other objects. Thus, on this approach discernment can be informally seen as
a two-step procedure. In the first step we ensure that the pair of objects we are
interested in can be singled out from the rest of the domain thanks to the non-existence
Fig. 7 A three-element circular graph
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of symmetries connecting these objects with some of the remaining elements of the
domain. In the second step we can apply whatever discernibility relation we want to the
pair selected in such a way. This informal procedure can be spelled out as follows using
Wit-Sym as an example (analogous definitions can be formulated for any other grade
of discernibility):
(10) If there is no class of symmetry-indiscernibility properly including {a, b},
then Wit-SymA(a, b) iff there is an object c 2 dom ðAÞ and a dyadic formula
u in LA, such that.
(i) Au a; cð Þ and A2u b; cð Þ, and
(ii) there is no object d and symmetry p such that p(a) = b, p(b) = a,
p(c) = d, and p(d) = c.
Let us abbreviate the condition expressed in the antecedent of (10) as UA(a, b). I
interpret the fact thatUA(a, b) is satisfied as ensuring that the pair (a, b) has been effectively
singled out from the background structure. In the case when :UA(a, b), we can either
stipulate that a and b are indiscernible, or assume that the two-place relation of witness-
discernibility simply does not apply to them (it does not make sense to ask whether a is
discernible from b, since we can’t even identify which a and b we have in mind).
Restricting the applicability of the relations of discernibility to pairs of objects
satisfying condition UA has the surprising effect of erasing the distinction between some
of these relations, and therefore reducing the number of extensionally non-equivalent
grades of discernibility. The following, easily provable theorems illustrate this fact:
Theorem 10 If UA(a, b), then in finite domains RelA
=(a, b) iff AbsA
=(a, b).
Theorem 11 If UA(a, b), then :S-SymA(a, b) iff :SymA(a, b).
Theorem 10 states that under the assumption that UA(a, b) relative discernibility in
L¼A is equivalent to absolute discernibility in L¼A in finite domains. The right-to-left
implication has already been established, so we have to prove the converse only. Let
us then suppose that RelA
=(a, b). The condition UA(a, b) can be satisfied in two ways:
either there is no symmetry connecting a and b, or there is a symmetry which swaps a
and b. The second case is impossible, since by assumption there is a formula u such
that Au a; bð Þ and A2u b; að Þ, and hence no transformation that swaps a with
b can be a symmetry. But the first case just means that :SymA(a, b), and by Theorem
2(a) AbsA
=(a, b) follows in finite domains. Theorem 11 is even easier to prove. If there
is a symmetry mapping a into b but the class of symmetry-indiscernibility containing
a and b does not include any other element, then obviously this symmetry transposes
a and b. Hence SymA(a, b) implies S-SymA(a, b).
It may be noted that there are infinite counterexamples to the left-to-right
implication of Theorem 10. One such counterexample is constructed as follows: let’s
take two copies of the structure consisting of integers ordered by the less-than
relation—hZ1, \1i and hZ2, \2i—and let’s consider the structure A = hZ1 [ Z2, \i
such that for all x [ Z1, y [ Z2, x \ y, while\ restricted to Z1 and Z2 gives\1 and
\2, respectively. It can be easily established that 01 and 02 are relatively discernible
by the relation \, and that the condition UA(01, 02) is satisfied, since there is no
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symmetry mapping 01 into 02. And yet no formula in L¼A absolutely discerns 01
from 02.
On the other hand, as all the counterexamples that we have used to falsify the
implications WeakA(a, b) ) :SS-SymA(a, b) ) Wit-SymA(a, b) ) :S-SymA(a, b)
satisfy condition UA, the grades WeakA, :SS-SymA and Wit-SymA remain distinct
from each other (Fig. 8 depicts all the logical relations between grades of discernibility
under the assumption that the condition UA is satisfied—as before, dashed arrows
represent implications that hold in finite domains only). But if we agree that witness
symmetry-discernibility constitutes the ‘‘upper bound’’ of the set of intuitively
acceptable grades of discernibility, then our choice is effectively reduced to absolute
discernibility in LA, relative discernibility in LA,14 absolute discernibility in L¼A , and
witness symmetry-discernibility. I do not wish to commit myself unconditionally to
any of these four interpretations. However, at the end of this survey I would like to
address one conceptual challenge that affects the weakest of the selected grades—
witness symmetry-discernibility.
7 The Transitivity of Indiscernibility
Ladyman, Linnebo and Pettigrew were the first to observe that relative discernibility
suffers from one conceptual difficulty which does not affect the remaining two basic
grades of discernibility: absolute and weak. The troublesome feature of relative
discernibility is that its complement, i.e. the relation of relative indiscernibility, is
not transitive, and hence cannot be an equivalence relation. This is surprising, as
indiscernibility seems to be a type of identity, and therefore should possess the
formal properties of an equivalence relation: reflexivity, symmetricity and
transitivity. Ladyman, Linnebo and Pettigrew consider the fact that relative
indiscernibility is not transitive to be a strong argument against the viability of this
grade of discernibility. It is open to debate whether the non-transitivity of
indiscernibility could be somehow explained away as being a result of its inherent
vagueness or contextuality. I will not attempt to explore this avenue, but I would
Fig. 8 Logical relations between grades of discernibility with the condition UA in place
14 It can be quickly verified that RelA does not imply AbsA even when the condition UA is satisfied and
the domain is finite. A simple counterexample illustrating this fact is a two-element graph in which
objects a and b are connected by an arrow, and in addition to that an arrow links each object with itself. In
this model a and b are relatively but not absolutely discernible in LA, and yet the condition UA is satisfied,
because there is no symmetry connecting a and b.
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like to point out that two more grades of discernibility encounter the same difficulty,
namely :S-SymA and Wit-SymA. Actually, the example used by Ladyman et al.
(2012, p. 183) can serve as an illustration of the violation of transitivity for both :S-
SymA and Wit-SymA (see Fig. 9 above).
As can be quickly verified, the following permutations are symmetries of the
structure depicted in the diagram: (ac)(bd)(a0c0)(b0d0) and (bc)(a0d0)(b0d)(ac0). This
implies that :Wit-SymA(a, c) and :Wit-SymA(c, b), since condition 9 (ii) is
violated for all objects in the domain. But a and b are relatively discernible, and
therefore must be witness symmetry-discernible. Hence witness symmetry-
indiscernibility turns out to be non-transitive.
An interesting fact, which I would like to report now, is that the restriction of the
applicability of various grades of discernibility to the pairs of objects satisfying
condition UA has the effect of securing the validity of transitivity, albeit in a semi-
vacuous form. That is, transitivity of the complement of any relation of discernibility
can never be violated, because we can’t find three distinct objects a, b, c such that
UA(a, b), UA(b, c), and a is indiscernible from b while b is indiscernible from c (in any
sense of indiscernibility stronger than SymA). From the assumption that pairs (a, b)
and (b, c) are indiscernible it follows that SymA(a, b) and SymA(b, c). In that case the
truth of UA(a, b) implies that {a, b} is a separate class of symmetry-indiscernibility,
and therefore there can’t be a distinct object c such that UA(b, c). On the other hand, it
is impossible to find a counterexample to transitivity using only two objects a and b,
since all relations of indiscernibility are reflexive. Thus, as long as we limit ourselves
to pairs satisfying UA, no problem of transitivity arises.
This result can be easily repeated in case we interpret a given relation of
indiscernibility as including all pairs (a, b) for which :UA(a, b). That is, it can be
quickly verified that the relation :UA(a, b) _ :DA(a, b), where DA is any grade of
discernibility weaker than :SymA, is transitive. To see that, let us notice first that the
relation :UA(a, b) is itself transitive (this follows directly from the definition). Thus,
we have to consider two cases only: (i) :UA(a, b) and :DA(b, c), (ii) :DA(a, b) and
:DA(b, c). Thanks to the assumption that :DA(a, b) ? SymA(a, b), both in case
(i) and in case (ii) it can be inferred that a, b, c belong to the same class of
indiscernibility. This can already secure the conclusion that :UA(a, c) if only a, b,
Fig. 9 A counterexample to the transitivity of indiscernibility
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c are three distinct objects. But if some of these objects are in fact identical, the
condition of transitivity is satisfied trivially, as we have already noted. Hence, the
stated fact is proven.
8 Conclusion
I have used two main tools to trim the excess of available grades of discernibility. One of
them was the intuition that the primary purpose of discerning objects is to be able to tell
them apart. This intuition finds its formal reconstruction in the notion of witness
symmetry-discernibility as the weakest acceptable grade of discernibility. The other tool
was the assumption that before we can even start discerning any two objects we have to
find a way to single them out from the rest of the domain. Combining these two tools we
have achieved a dramatic reduction of the number of acceptable grades of discernibility.
If we limit ourselves to finite domains and admit identity in the vocabulary of our
language, then the choice is between absolute discernibility and witness symmetry-
discernibility only. Admitting infinite models gives us two additional grades of
discernibility: symmetry-discernibility and relative discernibility. Those who find the
use of the identity symbol objectionable may wish to use the concepts of absolute and
relative discernibility in the languageLA rather thanL¼A . But they have to accept the fact
that these two concepts do not coincide even in models with finite domains.
How relevant to the current discussions on the status of objects in quantum
mechanics and relativity is the logical analysis carried out in this paper? An
exhaustive answer to this question would probably require an altogether new paper.
However, some immediate metaphysical and methodological consequences are
relatively easy to draw. As I mentioned on several occasions in this paper, the main
focus of the metaphysical debates regarding the status of elementary particles and
spatiotemporal points has been on the concept of weak discernibility. Given the
well-known fact that the entities postulated in our most fundamental physical
theories are weakly discernible by appropriate physically meaningful relations, it is
often argued that this fact is sufficient to grant the fundamental physical entities the
status of objects possessing some form of quality-based individuality (with no need
of resorting to haecceities or other metaphysically suspicious notions). One of the
main lessons of this paper is that this argument is too hasty. Individuality
presupposes the possibility of making reference to separate objects, and—as I tried
to argue above—not all grades of discernibility guarantee that. Arguably, the
weakest grade of discernibility that can help us tell two objects apart in the way
which makes it possible to refer to any one of them separately is witness symmetry-
discernibility. But it is straightforward to observe that the permutation invariance of
systems of particles of the same type in quantum mechanics, and the existence of
non-trivial symmetries of spacetime in GR, prevent the fundamental entities of these
theories from being discernible by the relation Wit-SymA. The relation of weak
discernibility holding between two particles of the same type, or between two
spatiotemporal points, can ensure that the number of objects is indeed two, but falls
short of separating them in the way individuals are supposed to be separable.
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The additional restriction of discernibility to pairs of objects which don’t belong to
three-or-more-element classes of symmetry-indiscernibility (as suggested in Sect. 6)
further compounds the situation of the defenders of the qualitative individuality of
fundamental entities in physics. For presently no relation of discernibility (not even
weak discernibility) seems to be applicable to these objects, since they certainly
belong to enormous classes of symmetry-indiscernibility (think about all the electrons
in the universe forming one incredibly large class of indiscernibility). Thus, it looks
like those who insist that our best physical theories postulate entities whose
metaphysical status is that of non-individuals receive an additional argument in favor
of their claim. One possible reaction to this development is to accept the above verdict
and try to develop the best logical theory of such non-individuals (for instance in the
form of either quasi-set or quaset theory; for a survey of these options see e.g. Dalla
Chiara et al. 1998). But an alternative option—which I urge but have no space to
adequately argue for—is to take a step back and reconsider the origin of the whole
quandary. My subsequent remarks about this option may be seen as rather nebulous,
but I hope that the readers will understand that I could not possibly explain this
complicated matter to their full satisfaction in the remainder of this paper.
At the bottom of the metaphysical problems with fundamental physical entities
lies the Absolute Indiscernibility Thesis. Restricting ourselves to the case of
quantum mechanics, we can spell it out in the form of the claim that, due to the
Symmetrization Postulate, no two particles of the same type can ever be absolutely
discerned by their properties (whether monadic or relational). The arguments in
favor of this claim given in the literature (see footnote 2 for references) rely on the
labeled tensor product Hilbert space formalism, to use Teller’s famous expression
(Teller 1995, p. 20). Some commentators, including Teller himself, argue that this
formalism is not metaphysically neutral, as it seems to presuppose the existence of
primitive identities expressed in the labels. Thus the question arises whether it is
possible to formulate the problem of absolute discernibility in a more neutral
framework. One option is to use the Fock space formalism, but another, perhaps less
radical, is to retain the tensor product formalism but limit the acceptable physical
quantities to the symmetric ones (in which case the labels can assume the role of a
harmless formal tool with no deeper meaning). I have no space to go into any details
here, but it may be argued that in such a case particles of the same type can, in
certain experimental situations, be claimed to be absolutely discernible by their
adequately formalized properties. Interested readers can find a more detailed though
still preliminary discussion of this controversial claim in my (Bigaj 2015). If this
argument is correct (and this is a big ‘‘if’’), then in a surprising twist quantum
particles may be ‘‘rehabilitated’’ as objects capable of being picked out and referred
to individually, and not only collectively in the form of aggregates.
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